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BILSKI'S EFFECT ON PATENT LAW: PATENTABLE
PROCESSES UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Sharon Barkume
I. INTRODUCTION
Most people would question whether a patent for the method
of reserving a restroom is inventive. Regardless, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") granted IBM a patent, which
claimed a method comprising two steps: (1) receiving a reservation
request from a user; and (2) notifying the user "when [the] restroom
[is] available for his or her use."' However, shortly after issue, IBM
disclaimed all the claims, 2 likely because the patent was so ridicul-
ous. Does the allowance of this type of patent comport with the writ-
ers of the Constitution and Congress's view of the purpose of a patent
system? 3  Would the patent be less objectionable if the claim in-
. Sharon Barkume is a Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center, May 2011 and has a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Maryland.
She is a registered patent agent at Barkume and Associates, P.C. She wishes to thank her
husband, patent attorney Anthony Barkume, for spending many hours debating this case and
for all his support. She would also like to thank Professors David Aker and Rena Seplowitz
for all their advice and assistance.
1 U.S. Patent No. 6,329,919 BI (filed Aug. 14, 2000) (issued Dec. 11, 2001) (describing a
computer based process used by a passenger on an airplane/boat/train).
2 U.S. Patent No. 6,329,919 Cl (filed Feb. 12, 2002) (issued Oct. 8, 2002). Had the broad
claim incorporated the airplane/boat/train computer system, maybe the patent would not
have been so ridiculous. This is likely what IBM thought when it applied for its patent.
3 "A patent is a contract between an inventor and the U.S. government under which the
government grants the inventor a limited monopoly" for approximately 20 years from the
filing of the application and "the inventor discloses [his or her] complete invention to the
public." Ronald B. Hildreth, Definition of a Patent, 2006 PRAc. L. INST. PAT. L.: PRAc.
GUIDE § 1:2. Each patent contains "a specification and at least one claim." Id. § 2:2. "The
specification describes the complete invention" and the "claim defines the legal rights of the
patent owner." Id. An examiner at the PTO examines a patent application to determine if
the "claimed subject matter is new, useful, and unobvious over the prior art" in light of the
specification. Id. §§ 2:4, 3:3. The examiner may reject the claim as being non-statutory
subject matter under 35 U.S.C.A. § 101; anticipated subject matter under 35 U.S.C.A. § 102;
obvious subject matter under 35 U.S.C.A. § 103; or claimed too broadly and/or not fully
379
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cluded a computer programmed with software for implementing the
method? Should the PTO have rejected the claim under: Section
101 4 because the claimed invention was a mental process; Section
112,s as indefinite because the invention was not distinctly claimed6
(by not including the computer); or Sections 102 or 103,' because the
claimed invention was not novel or was obvious?
In 2005, Judge Smith, an administrative patent judge on the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), wrote a dissent-
ing opinion in Ex Parte Lundgren' questioning the constitutionality
of method claims that did not include the use of a computer, a ma-
chine, or an apparatus.9 He explained that a claimed process that is
described by the specification under § 112. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§
1.01, 3.01, 5.02[4], 7.01, 7.03 (2010). An applicant may appeal a decision from an examiner
at the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), and thereafter, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), and finally the United States
Supreme Court. Hildreth, supra note 3, § 2:4. There are a number of different types of
patents, such as utility patents, design patents, and plant patents. See id. §§ 1:7.1, 1:7.2,
1:7.3. This comment pertains to utility patents and more specifically to utility patents that
have process or method claims.
4 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010).
' Id. § 112.
6 The claims define the invention. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 8.01. When an invention is
not distinctly claimed, its scope is too broad and it encompasses more than the actual
invention. Id. § 8.03. When the scope covers the prior art, it will also be rejected under
§ 102 and/or § 103 because things already in public domain may not be covered by a patent.
Id. §§ 3.01, 5.02[4]. When the scope covers processes of the human mind, "[1]aws of nature,
physical phenomena, [and/]or abstract ideas," it will also be rejected under Section 101.
Hildreth, supra note 3, § 1:7.1.
7 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 102(a), 103(a) (West 2010).
8 No. 2003-2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1385-86 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28, 2005). (reversing the
decision of the PTO examiner, which rejected the applicant's claims for a "method of
compensating manager of [a] business firm" as unpatentable under Section 101 because the
method was "outside the technological arts," or more specifically, it was an economic theory
not tied to a computer or apparatus; the B.P.A.I. reversed the examiner because the method
"produce[d] a useful, concrete, tangible result without preempting other uses of the
mathematical principle") (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In re Bilski (In re Bilski), 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc), affd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos (Bilski), 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The case name at the United States Supreme Court was originally
Bilski v. Doll, but it was revised to Bilski v. Kappos prior to the oral arguments before the
Court when David J. Kappos replaced John J. Doll as the director of the PTO. See Bilski v.
Doll (Bilski v. Doll), 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009); David Kappos Confirmed as Patent and
Trademark Office Director, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/
2009aug07.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
9 Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388 (Smith, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the patent
system was created by the United States Constitution to encourage advances in technology).
2
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not limited by technology includes "human conduct or thought
processes," which may be "totally unrelated to any science or tech-
nology."10
Three members of the United States Supreme Court asked a
similar question in 2006.11 The questioned patent involved a process
for (1) assessing the level of homocysteine in a bodily fluid and (2)
observing whether the level is higher than normal for determining a
vitamin deficiency. 12  The Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the invention was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 but eventually declined to hear the case.13 When the Court de-
nied certiorari, Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion joined in by
Justices Stevens and Souter, stating that this "process [was nothing]
more than an instruction to read some numbers in light of medical
knowledge," and was, therefore, an unpatentable mental process.14
The dissenters questioned whether the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), which has jurisdic-
tion for all patent matters appealed from the PTO and the district
courts, applied an improper test for determining patentable subject
matter.'5
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion in EBay Inc. v. Mer-
cexchange, L.L.C.,1 6 also questioned whether method claims directed
towards doing business should be patentable subject matter, stating
that business method patents were vague and suspect.'7  A business
10 Id
n See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The three members were Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens, and Justice
Souter. Id.
12 id
" Id. at 125-26.
14 Id. at 137-38. Lab. Corp. contended that the claim should have been invalidated for
indefiniteness under Section 112. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 130-31.
15 Id. at 136 (stating that the Supreme Court has never said "that a process is patentable if
it produces a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result,' . . . and, if taken literally, the statement
would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary" (quoting State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943).
16 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that permanent injunctive relief should only be given
based on the traditional four-factor test rather than as a general rule in patent infringement
cases).
17 Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]njunctive relief may have different
consequences for the burgeoning number of patents over business methods . . . [and]
potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus
under the four-factor test.").
2011]1 38 1
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method patent typically claims a computer process directed towards
automated financial, or management, data processing methods.' 8 The
Federal Circuit stated, in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.,' 9 that a business method should have "the
same legal requirements" as any other method or process. 20 Never-
theless, many commentators agree with Justice Kennedy's comment
because a majority of claimed business methods have been performed
by companies for decades by humans, rather than by computers pro-
grammed with algorithms. 2 1 The problem with some of these busi-
ness method patents is similar to the problem of the IBM restroom
reservation patent, namely that the claims meet the Federal Circuit's
test for determining patentable subject matter under Section 101
without claiming a computer or apparatus, and the PTO has failed to
find prior art to allow a rejection under Sections 102 and 103, even
though the method is debatably "in the public domain." 22 In fact, be-
cause of the proliferation of these questionable patents, Congress has
enacted 35 U.S.C. § 273, which gives an infringer of a business me-
thod patent a statutory defense to patent infringement when the in-
fringer has used the patented business method at least one year prior
to the filing date of the patent.23
In 2009, the Federal Circuit responded to the Supreme Court's
criticisms by rejecting the "useful, concrete, and tangible result"
18 USPTO White Paper-Automated Business Methods-Section III Class 705, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/afndpm/cl
ass705.jsp (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). Business methods include market analysis,
advertising management, catalog systems, incentive programs, redemption of coupons, credit
and load processing, point of sale systems, billing, funds transfer, banking, clearinghouses,
tax processing, investment planning, human resource management, scheduling, accounting,
and inventory monitoring. Id.
'9 149 F.3d 1368.
20 Id. at 1375. The Supreme Court had not addressed the issue, but the PTO stated that
patentability of business methods had become more prevalent because "data processing
systems have become sufficiently developed to begin to allow us to fully tap our ingenuity in
the business method arts." USPTO White Paper-Automated Financial or Management
Data Processing Methods (Business Methods), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
htT://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html.
See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV.
1139, 1141 (1999).
22 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1007 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
23 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(1) (West 2010) (effective Nov. 29, 1999). The use of a business
method for more than a year prior to the filing of a patent that claims the business method
should preclude the patent from issuing. Id. § 102(b). However, when the PTO does not
have a record of the business method's use, then a questionable patent is allowed to be
issued. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1007 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 27382
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test 24 for determining patentable subject matter under Section 101,
and reaffirming the Supreme Court's "machine-or-transformation"
test 25 last stated in Diamond v. Diehr.26  Diehr was decided more
than twenty-five years earlier, and was the last time the Supreme
Court addressed a patentable process under Section 101.27 This was
long before the proliferation of computers and the Internet. There-
fore, the Federal Circuit asked the Supreme Court for review of In re
Bilski,28 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.29 Because Bilski
claimed a business method that was not tied to a computer, three dis-
senting judges in In re Bilski also questioned whether business me-
thods and software not tied to a computer are patentable subject mat-
ter.30  Consequently, in deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court
considered: (1) whether the machine-or-transformation test is the ap-
propriate Section 101 patentability test for method claims, (2) wheth-
er business methods are patentable, and (3) whether Bilski's claims
were an abstract idea.
Part II of this comment will discuss the purpose of the patent
system and the definition of patentable subject matter stated in Sec-
tion 101 of the patent statute. Part III will present Supreme Court
cases that have interpreted patentable processes under Section 101
prior to Bilski. Part IV will present Federal Circuit cases that have
interpreted patentable process under Section 101 in light of the
Court's decisions. Part V will discuss issues in defining a test to de-
24 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 (majority opinion).
25 Id. at 960.
26 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or ap-
plies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a
whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to
protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or
thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of [Section] 101.
Id. at 192.
27 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1013 (Rader, J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 956 (majority opinion).
29 Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735.
30 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950; id at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); id at 998 (Mayer, J.,
dissenting); id at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting). However, the claim did recite initiating
transactions between customers and determining a fixed rate of a commodity. Id. at 995-96
(Newman, J., dissenting).
" Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223. The Court did not address whether a computer is a particular
machine, whether the transformation of data is an acceptable transformation, whether
software by itself is patentable, and when claims should be rejected under Sections 102, 103,
and 112 rather than Section 101.
2011] 383
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termine what is a patentable process. Part VI will explain the Su-
preme Court's decision in Bilski and its future implications.
II. THE PATENT STATUTE
Article one, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitu-
tion provides the justification for the patent system: "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries."3 2  Justice O'Connor explained in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,33 that the purpose of the fed-
eral patent system is to encourage the creation and disclosure of new,
useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return
for the exclusive right to exclude others from making, using or sel-
ling34 the invention for a period of years.3" Upon expiration of that
period, the knowledge of the invention is available for people to use
without restriction.36 The "goal of the patent system is to bring new
designs and technologies into the public domain." 3 7  Because "re-
search . . . may be costly and time consuming; monetary incentives
may matter[,]" and the research and outcome from those incentives
may greatly "benefit ... the human race. "31
Congress defined patentable subject matter in 35 U.S.C. §
101, which states, that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process,39 machine,40 manufacture,41 or composition of mat-
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (holding that a Florida statute, making it unlawful to duplicate
a vessel hull by a direct molding process, conflicted with federal patent law and was
therefore invalid).
34 Id. at 150-51.
[T]he right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the in-
vention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the
right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout
the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by
that process.
35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 2010).
3 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
36 Id. at 151 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87
(1933)).
" Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 126.
A process is also called a method (and a business method) and is an operation or series
of steps leading to a useful result. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.03.
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ter,42 or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a pa-
tent therefor[e], subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 43  Only an invention that fits into one of these four categories
may receive a patent."
Congress has made Section 101 broad to accommodate un-
known fields of creativity. 45 "Reports accompanying the 1952 [Pa-
tent] Act," in fact, stated "that Congress intended [patentable] subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.' ,46
This has led some people to believe that the courts should not interp-
ret patentable subject matter restrictively, and rather than reject ques-
tionable patents as not patentable subject matter under Section 101,
many of them should be rejected based on lack of novelty under Sec-
tion 102, as obvious under Section 103, or as not distinctly claimed
under Section 112. Congress's definition of a process has not
helped the courts because it uses, at least in part, the term to define
itself.4 8 It states that "[tihe term 'process' means process, art or me-
thod, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufac-
ture, composition of matter, or material."4 9
40 A machine includes apparatuses, mechanisms, and mechanical elements. Id. § 1.02[1].
41 Manufacture encompasses all man-made items not found in nature that are not
machines or compositions of matter. Id. § 1.02[3].
42 An intermixture of two or more ingredients that possess properties, which are different
from the ingredients in their separate state. Id. § 1.02[2].
4' 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
4 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (holding that Ohio's law of
trade secrets was not preempted by United States patent laws, even if process techniques
were patentable subject matter).
45 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The breadth of Section 101 and
its predecessor provisions reflects the legislative intention to accommodate not only known
fields of creativity, but also the unknown future.").
46 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-
1923, at 6 (1952)).
47 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 995-96 (Newman, J., dissenting). Section 101 is the first hurdle
that an inventor must pass to have his/her patent allowed. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372 n.2.
The next hurdle is § 112, which requires, inter alia, that the invention be distinctly claimed
and described with enough detail to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the
invention. Id. The final hurdles are § 102 and § 103, which together require that the
invention be novel and unobvious in view of the prior art. Id.
48 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978 (Newman, J., dissenting).
49 35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (West 2010) (effective Nov. 29, 1999).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DEFINITION OF PATENTABLE
PROCESS
The Supreme Court first defined the term process in Coch-
rane v. Deener.5 0 The Court held that a process, "[i]f new and use-
ful," is patentable, "irrespective of the particular form of the instru-
mentalities used."5' It noted that a process can be one or more acts
that transform a substance "to a different state or thing" regardless of
the tools used.52
In Gottschalk v. Benson,53 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a process that is performed on a computer is patent-
able subject matter.54 The Court held that the method for program-
ming a "general-purpose digital computer" to convert binary coded
decimal "BCD numerals to pure binary numerals" was not a patenta-
ble process because it was equivalent to patenting a mathematical
formula.55  The Court explained that ideas, mathematical equations,
"[p]henomena of nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract intellec-
tual concepts are not patentable."56 Citing Cochrane, the Court
stated that a "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a differ-
ent state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim
that does not include particular machines."57 Therefore, the Court
held that where a process, performed by a computer, transforms an
article or is "tied to a particular machine," the process is patentable.5 s
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of whether a
process that is performed on a computer is patentable subject matter
in Parker v. Flook.59 The Court held that a method for updating an
alarm limit 60 was not eligible for patent protection because essential-
so 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
s' Id at 787-88.
2 Id. at 788.
s 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
14 Id at 64.
"Id. at 71-72.
56 Id at 67.
5 Id. at 69-70 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787-88) (articulating the "Machine-or-
Transformation Test").
ss Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
9 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
60 The alarm limit was a number stored by a computer that signaled an abnormal condition
during a chemical catalytic conversion process. Id at 585. The number was calculated




Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss2/8
BILSKI'S EFFECT ON PA TENT LAW
ly it was a mathematical formula. 6' The method included the steps
of: (1) measuring conditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow
rates; (2) using an inventive algorithm to calculate a new alarm limit;
and (3) "updat[ing the] alarm-limit." 62 The Court stated that the only
inventive component was the mathematical algorithm, which was not
patentable under the mathematical algorithm exception doctrine, and,
therefore, the entire method was not patentable.63 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the steps of measuring the conditions and updating
of the alarm limit were " 'post-solution' activit[ies]."' Although
post-solution activity was not specifically defined by the Court, the
Court stated that a final step of indicating an answer to a mathemati-
cal formula did not make the method patentable subject matter be-
cause a "competent draftsman could attach some form of post-
solution activity to almost any mathematical formula." 6 5  Some
commentators criticized this decision for wrongly applying the re-
quirements of Section 102 and Section 103 in determining whether
the Section 101 requirements were fulfilled.66 The Court recognized,
in both this case and in Benson, that its decisions were based on "opi-
nions written before the modem business of developing programs for
computers was conceived," and asked Congress for clarification of
patent protection for computer programs that are novel and useful. 7
However, the Supreme Court took a different view towards
patentable subject matter in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.6 8  Although
61 Id. at 594-95 (holding the method unpatentable under Section 101).
Here it is absolutely clear that respondent's application contains no claim
of patentable invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as are the practice of moni-
toring the chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger
alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed and read-
justed, and the use of computers for "automatic monitoring-alarming."
Id at 594.
62 Flook, 437 U.S. at 585.
63 Id. at 594.
6 Id. at 590. The Federal Circuit refers to this as "extra-solution activity." In re Bilski,
545 F.3d at 957 n.14.
61 Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
66 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Section 101 requirement of
patentable subject matter is determined prior to, and separately from, determining what is
inventive, which is a Section 102 and Section 103 requirement. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372
n.2.
67 Flook, 437 U.S. at 595. See also Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
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the decision did not address computer related subject matter, the
Court stated that the only " 'prohibition against patents [is] for 'ideas'
or phenomena of nature.' "69 It emphasized that Section 101 should
be read broadly "to 'include anything under the sun that is made by
man.' "970
Although Congress still did not change Section 101 to specif-
ically include computer programs, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue again in Diehr.7 ' The Court held that the claimed invention for
an improved process of molding rubber articles was patentable.72
The Court found that the invention was not a mathematical formula,
but rather a method for transforming rubber into a different state.
The invention claimed "[a] method of operating a rubber-molding
press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital com-
puter, comprising" the steps of: (1) providing a data base for data
conversion; (2) inputting compound data; (3) setting a timer upon
closure of the press; (4) constantly determining and providing to the
computer the temperature of the mold; (5) updating the cure time us-
ing a mathematical formula; and (6) opening the press when the cure
time has expired.74 The Court stated:
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula
implements or applies that formula in a structure or
process which, when considered as a whole, is per-
forming a function which the patent laws were de-
signed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an ar-
ticle to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of [Section] 101.7
The Court noted that unlike the alarm-limit-update process in
Flook, this was not post-solution activity because it disclosed the
monitoring of process variables and how the variables were deter-
mined.76 Notably, the Court also stated that the claimed process
69 Id at 315 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593).
70 Id at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923).
7' Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
72 Id. at 184.
73 Id. at 191. The Court further reasoned "[t]hat [the] respondents' claims involve the
transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state
or thing cannot be disputed." Id. at 184.
74 Id. at 181 n.5.
7s Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
76 Id. at 193 n.14.
388 [Vol. 27
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might still be rejected under Section 102 or Section 103, but that pos-
sibility did not affect the decision of whether the molding process is
patentable subject matter under Section 101.n
However, Justice Stevens, dissenting, stated that computer
programs should be considered unpatentable subject matter because
they are based on mental steps, scientific concepts, or mere ideas.7 8
He also stated that the opening of the press in the present invention
was similar post-solution activity that caused the Flook invention to
be rejected as unpatentable subject matter.79 Finally, Justice Stevens
cautioned against patent protection of computer programs because the
PTO would be flooded with patent applications.8 0 Twenty-five years
later, but after significant changes in computer technology, Bilski
again brings up the issue of when a computer program with minor
physical steps is considered patentable subject matter, as debated by
Diehr's majority and dissent?81
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DEFINITION OF PATENTABLE
PROCESS
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent ap-
plication appeals, patent interferences, and decisions of district courts
throughout the country related to patent law.82 The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 created the Federal Circuit in order to, in-
ter alia, unify decisions from district courts throughout the country
regarding patent litigation with the decisions from the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") on patent eligibility. 83 In its first
decision, the Federal Circuit adopted the decisions of the CCPA as
precedent. 84 Hence, decisions from the Federal Circuit regarding pa-
tent law are similarly precedential to decisions by the Supreme
n Id. at 191.
78 Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. Here, the Court
stated "[blut times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected way."
Id
79 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
so Id. at 218.
8 Compare Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, with Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
82 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) (West 2010) (effective May 29, 2000). The district courts have
original jurisdiction over any litigation arising under United States patent laws. Id.
§ 1338(b).
83 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
* Id. at 1369.
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Court. 5 Since the Supreme Court accepts at most only a few patent
cases each year, and the Federal Circuit hears hundreds of patent cas-
es each year, some commentators believe that the Federal Circuit has
a greater understanding of patent matters. 86 Therefore, when deter-
mining patentable subject matter with regard to computer related sub-
ject matter, it is essential to review the decisions of the Federal Cir-
cuit and the precedents set by the CCPA.
In In re Bernhart,7 the CCPA acknowledged that a machine
that is programmed with an inventive mathematical relationship that
produces an output on a plotting apparatus should be patentable.
The court further addressed the issue of whether a computer software
program stored in a computer makes it a new machine.89 After stat-
ing that the issue is more of a Section 103 issue rather than a Section
101 issue, the court explained that a machine programmed in a new
way "is physically different from the machine without that pro-
gram."90 The court noted that the majority of "newly programmed
machines [will be] obvious to those skilled in the art" but that these
machines are patentable subject matter under Section 101.91
Likewise, in In re Freeman,92 the CCPA held that a patent for
a computer typesetter that neither recited, nor preempted, a mathe-
matical algorithm, was patentable subject matter under Section 101. 93
The court read Benson as holding mathematical algorithms, rather
than general computer program algorithms, as unpatentable subject
matter.94 The court also held that post-solution activity only applied
to mathematical algorithms.9' Accordingly, in In re Walter,96 the
85 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar
ofPatents, 2002 SUP. Cr. REv. 273, 274-76 (2002).
86 Id. at 276-77.
8 417 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that a computer, programmed for
carrying out a portrayal process, by outputting on a plotting apparatus a two dimensional
representation of a three-dimensional object, is patentable subject matter).
Id.
89 Id. at 1400.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
9 Id. at 1247.
94 Id. at 1245-46.
9s Id. at 1246.
96 618 F.2d 758, 760 (C.C.P.A. 1980), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (claiming a
method of seismic surveying comprising the steps of: (1) transmitting downwardly into the
earth a train of seismic source waves; (2) receiving corresponding waves at geophone
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CCPA held that the claimed algorithm for a seismic surveyor was on-
ly a mathematical equation and not patentable subject matter.97 The
court explained that if the claim is merely a mathematical algorithm
and is not applied to physical elements or does not limit process
steps, then "no amount of post-solution activity" would make it pa-
tentable subject matter under Section 101.98 The court also stated
that a field of use limitation in the preamble99 of the claim would not
save the claim.100
The CCPA next addressed the issue of a method patent claim-
ing a mathematical formula on a computer in In re Abele.'01 Using
the rationale of Diehr, the court held that an improvement in a CAT-
scan by a computerized process was patentable subject matter where
the method included "production, detection and display steps," as op-
posed to solely mathematical algorithm steps.102 This case was im-
portant for two reasons. First, the court stated a two part test for pa-
tentability that became known as the Walter-Freeman-Abele test, in
which the claims are first analyzed to determine if there is a mathe-
matical algorithm, and if so, whether the algorithm is "applied in any
manner to physical elements or process steps."l 03 Second, by allow-
ing some claims and rejecting other claims, the court showed the dis-
tinct line between patentable subject matter and unpatentable subject
matter. 1
Subsequently, in In re Grams,0 5 the Federal Circuit added
stations; (3) converting waves to digital samples; and (4) performing a mathematical
algorithm on the digital samples).
9 Id. at 77 1.
9 Id. at 767.
9 On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(explaining that a field of use limitation in the preamble may limit the claim by "stat[ing] a
necessary and defining aspect of the invention," or may not limit the claim by merely stating
"an introduction to the general field of the claim").
100 Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
'0 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
102 Id. at 908-09 (distinguishing application of a mathematical algorithm that included
"production, detection and display steps" from non-essential post-solution activity).
103 Id. at 906-07.
10 Id. See also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63 (stating that the broad claim in Abele "of
graphically displaying [data] variances" was not patentable subject matter because the type
of data or where it came from was not specified, but the narrow claims specifying the display
of X-ray data "of bones, organs, and other body tissues," was patentable subject matter).
'os 888 F.2d 835, 836, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that a method for diagnosing the
existence of an abnormality in an electrical, mechanical, chemical, or biological system was
not patentable subject matter; also stating that because the claims were rejected as a
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"data-gathering," to "post-solution activity" and "field of use limita-
tion" in the preamble, as not saving a claim that is merely a mathe-
matical algorithm from being rejected under Section 101.106 The
Federal Circuit stated that the addition of a "data-gathering" step does
not make a mathematical algorithm patentable under Section 101
when the data was not transformed and, therefore, it is the same as
non-essential "post-solution activity," as stated in Flook.0 7
Twelve years after the Walter-Freeman-Abele test was estab-
lished, the Federal Circuit articulated a new test in In re Alappat.0 8
In the patent application, Alappat used means plus function language
for claiming a digital oscilloscope programmed with anti-aliasing
software that eliminated discontinuity in a waveform to allow for a
smooth continuous wave to be displayed. 109 The court stated that the
mathematical algorithm exception applies to apparatus claims as well
as process claims. "o Nevertheless, the court found that the claimed
invention, as a whole, was not a mathematical equation or an abstract
idea, "but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and
tangible result.""' The court articulated that when a general-purpose
computer is programmed to perform a claimed invention, it becomes
a new machine, a special purpose computer.112
Conversely, in the same year that Alappat was decided, the
Federal Circuit, in In re Schrader,"' held that a method of conduct-
ing an auction that used a mathematical optimization algorithm was
unpatentable because no specific machine or apparatus was in the
claims.114 The method comprised the steps of: (1) "identifying a plu-
rality of related items in a record"; (2) offering the "items to a plurali-
ty of potential bidders"; (3) receiving bids for one or more of the
mathematical algorithm, the issue of whether the claims were unpatentable as a method of
doing business was not addressed).
1o6 Id. at 839-40. In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit groups data gathering with post
solution activity and refers to both as "extra-solution activity." In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963.
107 In re Grams, 888 F.2d at 837, 839-40.
1os 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (stating the "useful, concrete, and
tanAible result" test), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
Id. at 1537-38. A digital oscilloscope is used to accurately observe the wave shape of
an electrical signal. Id.
10 Id. at 1544. The Federal Circuit first stated its "useful, concrete, and tangible result"
test to replace the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in Alappat. State St., 149 F.3d at 1374.
.. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
112 Id. at 1545.
1 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
114 See id. at 294 (using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test).
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items; (4) entering the bids in the record; (5) indexing each bid; and
(6) assembling a completion of the bids to identify, in the record, the
bid corresponding to the highest price.115 The court stated that the
method was similar to "mathematical optimization procedures."' 16
Even though the method required the step of recording the bids of an
item, the court relied on Flook in holding that this step was only in-
significant post-solution activity rather than a transformation of phys-
ical objects and, therefore, the invention was an abstract mathemati-
cal algorithm and unpatentable subject matter."'
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman viewed the process as
patentable subject matter stating that transforming bids in a record is
"more than mental steps" because it requires computational steps and
is no different from transforming data that represents "parameters in a
process for curing rubber.""' Judge Newman also addressed a rejec-
tion from the BPAI for a business method exception, even though the
majority did not.119 She questioned whether a business method ex-
ception existed under Section 101 in the Federal Circuit's case law
and stated that in modern business systems it is difficult to discern "a
method of 'doing' business" with other statutory computerized
processes.120  She further stated that all business method claims
should be rejected under Sections 102, 103, and 112 rather than under
Section 101.121
In 1998, the Federal Circuit started shifting the law through
its decision in State Street, holding that a data processing system for
administrating mutual funds for increased tax advantages was patent-
able.122  The claims comprised: (1) a computer processor for
processing data; (2) storage for storing data; and (3) multiple logic
1s Id. at 292.
116 Id at 293.
1d. at 294.
1 Schrader, 22 F.3d at 296-97 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186)
(stating that both require a mathematical calculation to produce a useful output)).
"' See id at 297-98. Since the majority found the claims were a mathematical
abstraction, it did not address a rejection from the BPAI based on the business method
exception to Section 101. Id. at 296 n.14 (majority opinion).
120 Id. at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that a business method exception was
"fuzzy .. . error-prone, redundant, and obsolete").
121 Id. ("Patentability does not turn on whether the claimed method does 'business' instead
of something else, but on whether the method, viewed as a whole, meets the requirements of
patentability as set forth in Sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act.").
122 State St., 149 F.3d at 1370. The system is also known as a "Hub and Spoke Financial
Services" data processing system. Id.
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circuits for processing assets, income, expenses, and net realized
gain/loss, and allocating shares in a portfolio.12 3  In this case, the
court addressed both the mathematical algorithm exception and the
business method exception.124 The court explained that the mathe-
matical algorithm exception did not apply because the invention was
not an abstract idea since the algorithms were applied in a useful
way.125 The court held that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was not
applicable for determining statutory subject matter after Diehr and
Chakrabarty, and the appropriate test, stated in Alappat, was that a
method was patentable subject matter when it produced "a useful,
concrete, and tangible result." 26 The court explained that the use of
mathematical calculations by a machine to transform data that
represents dollar amounts into a share price met this test.127  The
court then rejected the questionable business method exception and
stated that business method claims are "subject to the same legal re-
quirements" as any other process claims.128 In response to the argu-
ment that an allowance of the claims would foreclose all compute-
rized accounting methods of this type, the court explained that the
claims should be rejected under Sections 102, 103, and 112, rather
than Section 101.129
The shift in the law was completed by AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.,130 in which the Federal Circuit held that the
process of adding a primary interexchange carrier ("PIC") indicator
to "a message record for long-distance telephone calls" was patenta-
ble subject matter.131 The claimed method for use in a telecommuni-
cations system comprised the following two steps:
[(1)] generating a message record for an interexchange
123 Id at 1371-72.
124 Id. at 1372. The business method exception was relied on prior to the elimination of
the requirement for invention by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act. Id at 1375. Since
1952, the mathematical algorithm exception to Sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 has been
used to judge the patentability of business methods. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375 n.10.
125 Id. at 1373.
126 Id. at 1374 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Id at 1373.
128 Id. at 1375 (citing Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting)).
129 State St., 22 F.3d at 1377.
130 172 F.3d 1352.
1' Id. at 1353, 1361. A PIC allows a long-distance telephone carrier to properly bill their
subscribers by signaling when the subscriber has called a person who uses a different long-
distance carrier; thereby requiring a higher fee. Id. at 1353.
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call between an originating subscriber and a terminat-
ing subscriber, and [(2)] including, in [the] message
record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator
having a value which is a function of whether or not
the interexchange carrier associated with [the] termi-
nating subscriber is a predetermined one of [the] inte-
rexchange carriers. 132
The district court in AT&T decided, prior to the Federal Cir-
cuit's State Street decision, that the claims comprised a mathematical
algorithm with a data-gathering step and were therefore, unpatenta-
ble.133 In reviewing the district court's decision, the Federal Circuit
stated that "[s]ince the process of manipulation of numbers is a fun-
damental part of computer technology, we have had to reexamine the
rules that govern the patentability of such technology."l 3 4 The court
held that the claims met the "useful, concrete, tangible result" test be-
cause they transformed one form of data into another form that was
useful. 135 When Excel Communications argued that there was no
"physical transformation" or "physical limitation," the court stated
that: (1) a physical transformation is only an example of a useful re-
sult, rather than a requirement; and (2) as long as the mathematical
algorithm was applied in a practical manner to produce a useful re-
sult, a physical transformation or limitation was not required. 136
Therefore, in applying the "useful, concrete, and tangible re-
sult" test, first articulated in Alappat and then again in State Street,
and by stating in AT&T, that physical transformations and limitations
were unnecessary to satisfy the "useful, concrete, and tangible result"
test, the Federal Circuit broadened the definition of a patentable
132 Id. at 1354 (emphasis omitted).
3 Id. at 1355.
134 AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1356.
135 See id. at 1358. The Court reasoned that "the judicially-defined proscription against
patenting of a 'mathematical algorithm,' to the extent such a proscription still exists, is
narrowly limited to mathematical algorithms in the abstract." Id. at 1356.
136 Id. at 1358-59.
[Pihysical limitations analysis seems of little value because "after Diehr
and Alappat, the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting
numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers,
in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject matter, unless,
of course, its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible
result.' "
Id. at 1359 (quoting State St., 149 F.3d at 1374).
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process to accommodate method claims that do not meet the machine
or transformation test stated in Diehr.13 7  Since the "useful, concrete,
and tangible result" test has been adopted by the Federal Circuit,
computer-managed processes in the information technology, banking,
e-commerce, medicine, data processing, industrial engineering, and
insurance fields have received expanded patent protection. 138 How-
ever, the broadening of what constitutes a patentable process has also
allowed for questionable patents that claim only human conduct and
mental processes, such as IBM's patent for a method of reserving a
restroom. 139
Seven years after AT&T Corp. was decided, and more than a
few questionable patents later, 140 the Supreme Court and the PTO
started to question the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test.14 1
In response to the Supreme Court's criticism, the Federal Circuit be-
gan to swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. In In re Com-
iskey,142 the court stated that Section 101 does not allow business sys-
tems that are entirely mental processes.143  The Federal Circuit
further stated that the Supreme Court has recognized only the ma-
chine-or-transformation test.'" A year after Comiskey, the Federal
Circuit created havoc when it addressed patentable subject matter
13 See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358-59.
138 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 992 (Newman, J., dissenting).
139 919 BI Patent.
140 See Brief for Respondent at 40-41 & n.20, Bilski v. Kappos, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)
(No. 08-964), 2009 WL 3070864 (U.S. Patent No. 6,457,317 ("Method of Selling
Merchandise on a Golf Course")); U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788 ("Methods and Investment
Instruments for Performing Tax-Deferred Real Estate Exchanges"); U.S. Patent No.
6,567,790 ("Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts Funded by
Nonqualified Stock Options"); U.S. Patent No. 6,206,374 ("Methods of Playing Poker
Games"); U.S. Patent No. 6,070,873 ("Card Game and Method of Playing Card Game");
U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 ("Systems and Methods for Making Jury Selection
Determinations").
141 See, e.g., Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Federal Circuit's rule in State Street "would cover instances where this Court has held the
contrary"); Ebay, 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to the "suspect
validity" of some of the patents issued under this rule); Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388
(Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that "the term process is so broad that it can be used to claim
inventions that cover nothing more than human conduct or thought processes that are totally
unrelated to any science or technology").
142 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (claiming a method of mandatory arbitration for
unilateral and contractual documents), withdrawn, In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
143 Comiskey, 499 F.3d. at 1378-79.
'4 Id. at 1376-77 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184).
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again in a sua sponte, en banc review in In re Bilski.145
Claim one of Bilski's patent recited "[a] method for managing
the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity pro-
vider at a fixed price" using a number of steps.146 The claim com-
prised the steps of: (1) "initiating a series of transactions between
[the] commodity provider and consumers . . . [who] purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages;" (2) "iden-
tifying market participants for [the] commodity having a counter-risk
position to [the] consumers; and" (3) "initiating a series of transac-
tions between [the] commodity provider and [the] market participants
at a second fixed rate such that . . . [the] transactions balance[] the
risk position of [the] series of consumer transactions."1 47
The PTO examiner rejected the claims because they were not
directed to an apparatus, such as a computer, and were therefore
merely an abstract idea.148 The BPAI rejected the claim because the
transformation of a "non-physical financial risk ... did not produce a
useful, concrete and tangible result." 49 The BPAI explained that the
claim preempted "every possible way of [a human or machine] per-
forming the steps of the .. . process," and therefore, it was an abstract
idea, rather than patentable subject matter.s 0
In reviewing the BPAI's decision, the Federal Circuit used the
opportunity to reject both "the useful, concrete and tangible result"
test and the Freeman- Walter-Abele test, and affirm the Supreme
Court's "machine-or-transformation" test."' The Federal Circuit
stated that the machine-or-transformation test was the only test pro-
vided by the Supreme Court to determine whether an applicant is at-
tempting "to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea)
or a mental process," and therefore, it was the proper test for deter-
mining the patentability of Bilski's claims.' 52 The court stated that "a
claim that recites 'physical steps' but neither recites a particular ma-
chine or apparatus, nor transforms any article into a different state or
14' 545 F.3d 943.
'4 Id. at 949.
147 id.
148 Id. at 950.
149 Id. (quoting Ex Parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *10, *18 (B.P.A.I.
Sept. 26, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
o In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950 (quoting Ex Parte Bilski, 2006 WL 5738364, at *20).
"' Id. at 959-60.
152 Id. at 952.
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thing, is not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter."l 53 In rejecting
Bilski's claims under Section 101, the court held that Bilski did not
claim a particular machine or a transformation, but rather a mental
process, because the physical steps of performing a mathematical cal-
culation on collected data and identifying transactions that would
"hedge each other's risks" based on the mathematical calculation,
were not limited to "a computer or any other device, . . . [and the]
step of consummating those transactions" was post-solution activi-
ty. 154
However, the court stated that in the past decade, the use of
computers and the Internet has begun to challenge the machine-or-
transformation test, and the court "recognize[d] that the Supreme
Court may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this
test to accommodate emerging technologies."15 5  The court further
stated that although there was no categorical exclusion of business
methods or software, 5 6 the transformation of an article should be "a
chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or sub-
stances."l5' The court questioned whether many of the raw materials
of information-age processes such as, electronic signals, electronical-
ly-manipulated data, legal obligations, organizational relationships,
and business risks are physical objects.118 The court did note, how-
ever, that a visual depiction that represents specific physical objects
is a transformation of a physical object.159
The Bilski decision was a seventy-two-page opinion that in-
cluded one concurring opinion and three dissenting opinions.160 Each
opinion stated why the machine-or-transformation test should or
153 Id. at 961 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 965.
155 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
156 Id. at 960.
Is. Id. at 962.
15 Id. at 962 (noting that broad independent claims which "recit[e] a process of
graphically displaying variances of data from average values" were not patentable subject
matter because the claims "did not specify any particular type or nature of data; nor did it
specify how or from where the data was obtained or what the data represented") (citing
Abele, 684 F.2d at 908-09).
'" Id. at 962-63 (noting that "one of Abele's dependent claims" was patentable subject
matter because it specified the data as X-ray attenuation data from a tomography scanner and
the data represented physical objects-"the structure of bones, organs, and other body
tissues") (citing Abele, 684 F.2d at 908-09).
'6 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
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should not be the test for determining patentable subject matter.
These opinions and the Federal Circuit's evolving definition of a
process to meet the requirements of Section 101 will be discussed in
the next two sections.
V. ISSUES IN DEFINING A TEST FOR DETERMINING
PATENTABLE PROCESSES
As can be seen by the Federal Circuit's decisions, there have
been adjustments in the past twenty-five years in determining when a
process is unpatentable, under both the Supreme Court's mathemati-
cal equation, abstract idea, fundamental principle exception doctrine
and the Federal Circuit's elusive business method exception, due to
the emergence of computers and the Internet. 162 As computers have
become more prolific, faster, and able to store more information,
many basic human functions or processes, in life and in business, are
performed by computers in new ways every day. Do these processes
fall into the abstract idea and mathematical algorithm exception doc-
trine?1 63 Should there be a business method exception doctrine? Are
these processes unpatentable subject matter per se, unpatentable sub-
ject matter unless claimed in association with computer hardware, or
patentable subject matter'" because obtaining patents in such fields
promotes technology? And ultimately, what test should be used to
help the PTO and the district courts determine when a process is pa-
tentable under Section 101? The Federal Circuit stated that the in-
quiry is not straightforward because today's process claims are not
limited to the industrial manufacturing process of Diehr, and are not
as abstract and mathematical as the algorithm in Benson.165
In his concurring opinion, Judge Dyk explained that the ma-
chine-or-transformation test appropriately distinguished patentable
subject matter because historically, "the only processes that were pa-
tentable were processes for using or creating manufactures, machines,
161 Id. at 972 (Dyk, J., concurring); id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); id at 1008-09
(Mayer, J., dissenting); id. at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
162 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
163 See id at 960 (grouping mental processes into this exception).
164 The method would be allowable under Section 101. However, it may still be rejected
under Sections 102, 103 or 112.
165 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
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and compositions of matter."' 66 However, each of the three dissent-
ing judges questioned the court's selection of the machine-or-
transformation test for different reasons.167
In his dissent, Judge Mayer noted that nearly every process
claim, whether a business method, human activity, or otherwise, can
be rewritten to include a machine or a physical transformation and
that the machine-or-transformation test will not "stem the growth of
[business] patents."' He also stated that the patent system has been
overwhelmed with business method patents 69 and "has run amok," in
allowing many ridiculous patents to be granted.170  In addition, he
explained that PTO has asked for assistance, but the machine-or-
transformation test will do little to help. 17 1 He believes that because
business methods "impede rather than promote innovation, [and] are
frequently of poor quality" there should be a requirement for ad-
vancement of science or technology in Section 101.172
However, Judge Rader, in his dissent, stated that the majority
should not have "disrupt[ed] settled and wise principles of law," but
rather, should have simply held that Bilski's method was an abstract
idea.17 3  He further stated that today's technology requires a newer
test than the machine-or-transformation test because patent eligibility
should not be linked "to the age of iron and steel at a time of sub-
atomic particles and terabytes."l 74  Judge Rader also stated that
"[t]oday's software transforms our lives without physical anchors.
This court's test not only risks hobbling these advances, but preclud-
16 Id. at 972 (Dyk, J., concurring).
167 See id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1008-09 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id. at
1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
168 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1008-09 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 1004 (stating that applications for business method "patents increased from fewer
than 1,000 applications in 1997 to more than 11,000 applications in 2007").
170 Id at 1010. Some of the more ridiculous patents included U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117
patenting a "method of training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays;" U.S.
Patent No. 5,862,223 patenting a "method for selling expert advice;" U.S. Patent No.
6,014,643 patenting a "method for trading securities;" U.S. Patent No. 6,119,099 patenting a
"method of enticing customers to order additional food at a fast food restaurant;" U.S. Patent
No. 6,329,919 patenting a "system for toilet reservations;" U.S. Patent No. 7,255,277
patenting a "method of using color-coded bracelets to designate dating status in order to limit
'the embarrassment of rejection;' " and U.S. Patent No. 6,049,811 patenting a "method for
obtaining a patent." Id at 1004.
'17 Id. at 1010.
172 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1005, 1009.
In Id. at 1011, 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
" Id at 1011.
400 [Vol. 27
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss2/8
BILSKI'S EFFECT ON PA TENT LAW
ing patent protection for tomorrow's technologies."'
Likewise, Judge Newman dissented because, in her opinion,
Section 101 should be interpreted broadly, and the machine-or-
transformation test is too narrow and excludes inventive technologies
that should be patentable.176 Judge Newman noted that "the Supreme
Court has consistently" refrained from restricting Section 101 so that
it can accommodate unknown future fields of creativity.177  Citing
previous cases, Judge Newman reasoned that information-based and
software-implemented inventions "have been dominant contributors
to today's economic growth and societal change [and that] [r]evision
of the commercial structure affecting major aspects of today's in-
dustr[ies] should be approached with care," as an exclusion of these
inventions impacts thousands of patents already granted by putting a
cloud over them. 178
Furthermore, Judge Newman stated that Bilski's patent appli-
cation described a process that is patent eligible under Section 101
because although one step used a mathematical calculation, other
steps obtained information and carried out commercial transactions
via a computer and the Internet. 7 9 However, she explained, because
Bilski's claims did not include the limitation of a computer, the in-
vention was not distinctly claimed thereby requiring a rejection under
Sections 102, 103, and 112 rather than Section 101.180
In adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the only test
for determining patent eligibility of processes under Section 101, the
Federal Circuit left many issues for another day.' 8 ' Specifically,
what is considered a physical object for the transformation prong? 82
Is a general-purpose computer a specific machine? 83 "What consti-
. Id. at 1015.
176 Id. at 978 (Newman, J., dissenting).
n In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977.
178 Id. at 976-77.
179 Id. at 995-96.
so Id. at 997.
181 Id. at 962 (majority opinion).
[I]ssues specific to the machine implementation part of the test are not
before us today. We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise
contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular
questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to
tie a process claim to a particular machine.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
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tutes 'extra-solution activity?' " 184 The Federal Circuit,' the
PTO,186 and the district courts' have faced many of these questions
since the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski, each with varying inter-
pretations.
184 Id See also id. at 963 (majority opinion) (explaining that extra-solution activity
includes both post-solution activity and data-gathering steps).
185 See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339,
1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding a method of optimizing thiopurine in a person
comprising three steps: (1) administering the drug to a subject; (2) determining the
metabolite levels; and (3) warning that an adjustment in dosage may be needed, meets the
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test because methods of treating
humans are always transformative), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) ("[The] case [is]
remanded to the . . . Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of Bilski v. Kappos.");
In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that a method of marketing
software failed to meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation test); Comiskey, 554
F.3d at 981 (remanding the case to the PTO to determine whether the dependent claims that
recited "the Internet, intranet, World Wide Web, software applications, telephone, television,
cable, video [or radio], magnetic, electronic communication, or other communications
means" contained patentable subject matter).
186 See, e.g., Ex parte Gutta, No. 2008-3000, 2009 Commr. Pat. LEXIS 59, at *6, *8
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 15, 2009) (holding that " '[a] computerized method performed by a data
processor' " for "recommending one or more available items . . . to a target user" was
unpatentable subject matter because a recitation in the preamble of a computer "adds nothing
more than a general purpose computer that is associated with the steps of the process in an
unspecified manner."); Ex Parte Cornea-Hasegan, No. 2008-4742, 2009 WL 86725, at *2,
*5, *6 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009) (holding that a "method of predicting results of floating point
mathematical operations and calculating the results" was unpatentable subject matter under
Bilski because even though the claims recited (1) a processor and (2) computer readable
media, the processor was not a particular machine, and computer readable media does not
limit the scope of the claim). But see, e.g., Ex parte Moyer, No. 2009-002154 (B.P.A.I. Jan.
20, 2010) (holding that the claim meets the machine-or-transformation test because it recites
a processor in each step and a processor becomes a particular machine when programmed
with instructions).
187 See, e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. David L. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1153, 1156 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (holding that a "computer aided method" of managing a credit application in the
preamble of the claim does not fulfill the machine prong within the meaning of Bilski);
Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., No. 2:07-cv-042, 2009 WL 6853402, at
*1, *3 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2009) (holding a consumer donation system did not recite a
"particular machine," but rather a general purpose computer in the claim and was therefore,
unpatentable subject matter); Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d
1068, 1071, 1077-78 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a credit card fraud verification process
over the Internet did not meet the machine-or-transformation test because credit card
numbers are data; credit card accounts are legal relationships; and manipulation of data or
legal relationships is not a transformation under Bilski, and a recitation of Internet in the
preamble did not meet the machine prong because the Internet is not a particular machine).
But see, e.g., Versata Software, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., No. 2-06-CV-358 (TJW),
2009 WL 1084412, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009) (stating that it did not interpret Bilski so
broadly as to exclude software that was not a fundamental principle, and therefore denied
summary judgment).
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VI. BILSKI V. KAPPOS
If the Federal Circuit and the patent community expected
guidance from the Supreme Court in Bilski, for determining what
processes are patent eligible, they will likely be disappointed. In fact,
the opinion written by Justice Kennedy created more questions than it
answered because no test was selected, no terms were defined, and
two sections of his opinion were not joined by Justice Scalia, making
those sections a plurality rather than a majority opinion.s88 Although
the Court affirmed Bilski in a nine to zero decision, the Court was
split as to whether any business methods should be patent eligible.18 1
The Court addressed three arguments as to why Bilski's
claimed invention was not patentable subject matter: "(1) it [was] not
tied to a machine and [did] not transform an article; (2) it involve[d] a
method of conducting business; and (3) it [was] merely an abstract
idea."' 90  The Court unanimously held that the machine-or-
transformation test was not the sole test in determining whether a
process is patent eligible and, therefore, Bilski's claims were not
invalid based on argument one. 191 However, the Court also unanim-
ously held that Bilski's claimed invention was an abstract idea and
hence, it was invalid based on argument three.192
The majority opinion and the concurring opinions by Justice
Stevens 93 and Justice Breyerl 94 made it clear "that the machine-or-
transformation test" was only a clue to patentable subject matter and
that a process could still qualify for a patent even if it did not meet
' Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223. Part II-B-2 addresses, but does not take a position on,
allowing patentability of software and other inventions of the information age, while Part 11-
C-2 addresses, but does not expand on, limiting patentability of business methods. Id. at
3227-29.
' Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 3257-59 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 3223 (plurality opinion). The questions presented for the oral arguments only
included the first argument; the Court added the last two argument to the opinion. See Bilski,
130 S. Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'9' Id. at 3227 (plurality opinion).
192 Id. at 3229-30.
1 Id. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring) (joining in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
were Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor).
194 Id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Scalia joined Part II only. Part I addressed
the unpatentability of business methods, and Part II addressed the "agreement among many
Members of the Court on many of the fundamental issues of patent law raised by this case."
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
4032011]
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this test.19 5 Though all three opinions stated that the Federal Circuit's
"useful, concrete, and tangible result" test was not the appropriate
test,19 6 none of the opinions suggested a more appropriate test to
guide the Federal Circuit in determining the line that delineates pa-
tentable processes from unpatentable processes. In addition, because
the Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive
test in determining a patent eligible process, none of the opinions cla-
rify what is a particular machine, a transformation, or extra-solution
activity.' 97 In reading Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Part II-
B-2, it appears as if four of the Justices would like "software, ad-
vanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on li-
near programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital
signals" to be patentable. 198 However, Justice Kennedy concluded
the section by stating that "[n]othing in this opinion should be read to
take a position on where [the patentability line] ought to be
struck."' 99
The majority opinion and both concurring opinions also made
clear that Section 101 should be interpreted broadly, but that "laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patent eligi-
ble.200 Quoting Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Court explained that
Bilski's claims are an abstract idea because they are directed towards
the basic concept of hedging, a reduction of the hedging concept to a
mathematical formula, and post-solution-activity. 20' However, other
than stating that a mathematical algorithm is an abstract idea, the ma-
jority does not define the term abstract idea.202
The contentious issue in Bilski is whether methods of doing
business are unpatentable subject matter per se. The majority asserts
that the term "method" "include[s] at least some methods of doing
9 Id. at 3227 (plurality opinion); id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 3258
(Breyer, J., concurring).
196 See id. at 3258-59 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting State St., 149 F.3d at 1373) (noting
that his views were "consistent with both the opinion of the Court and Justice Stevens'
opinion concurring in the judgment.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 These issues brought much uncertainty to the Federal Circuit case law. See supra
notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
'9' Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (plurality opinion).
'99 Id. at 3228.
200 Id. at 3225 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted);
id at 3253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185); id at 3258 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67).
201 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30 (plurality opinion).
202 Id at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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business" because it is difficult to categorically determine what is a
business method and a non-business method.203 In addition, 35
U.S.C. § 273(b)(1), which allows an infringer of a patented method to
claim prior use as a defense, defines a method "as 'a method of doing
or conducting business.' "204 However, the minority argued that
Bilski's claims were unpatentable because they were directed to a
method of doing business in addition to being an abstract idea, and
that business methods should not be patent eligible.205
Similar to the minority opinion, Justice Kennedy, in his plu-
rality opinion, questioned the vagueness and validity of business me-
20thod patents.206 He stated that
[I]f the [Federal Circuit] were to succeed in defining a
narrower category or class of patent applications that
claim to instruct how business should be conducted,
and then rule that the category is unpatentable be-
cause, for instance, it represents and attempt to patent
abstract ideas, this conclusion might well be in accord
with controlling precedent.207
203 Id at 3228 (majority opinion).
204 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(a)(3)).
205 See id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
stated that a more prudent way of denying Bilski's claims would have been to hold that they
were unpatentable because they were directed to an unpatentable business method rather
than an abstract idea. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232. This is because: (1) the majority did not
clearly show how the claimed method was an abstract idea and what "an unpatentable
abstract idea" actually is; (2) the history of patent law requires business methods to be
unpatentable; (3) "the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and particular description"
do not eliminate comical patents; (4) Section 273 merely limited the effects of State Street
and shows the judges on the Federal Circuit misunderstood Section 101; (5) patenting of
business methods stifles innovation, just as patenting of "laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas" does; (6) business methods do "not entail the same kinds of risk as does
more traditional, technological innovation," which require large outlay of expenses and
labor; (7) businesses will still move forward without business method patents; (8) businesses
can still protect themselves with trade secrets; (9) "[m]any business methods are practiced in
public" and therefore do not need disclosure for public knowledge; (10) many private
business methods "do not generate any efficiency but only provide a means for competitors
to one-up each other in a battle for pieces of the pie;" and (11) "[i]f business methods could
be patented, then many business decisions, no matter how small, could be potential patent
violations." Id at 3236, 3238, 3239, 3251-52, 3253, 3254-55, 3256.
206 Id. at 3229 (plurality opinion) (citing EBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
207 Id. (emphasis added). In addition, Justice Kennedy expressed a desire for "a high
enough bar" to be set to keep the Patent Office and the courts from being flooded with
business method claims. Id
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Nevertheless, similar to his plurality opinion in Part II-B-2,
Justice Kennedy did an about-face at the end of the section by stating
that business methods must pass the requirements of Section 102,
Section 103, and Section 112 and that "[t]hese limitations serve a
critical role in adjusting the tension, ever present in patent law, be-
tween stimulating innovation by protecting inventors and impeding
progress by granting patents."208
Given its lengthy history, one might ask how Bilski has af-
fected patent law? The PTO has interpreted Bilski as requiring that a
claimed invention that is an abstract idea must be found unpatentable
even if it meets the machine-or-transformation test.209 However, the
majority did not specifically state this holding. 210 The only certainty
as to how Bilski has affected patent law is that the Federal Circuit's
"useful, concrete, and tangible result" test is not an appropriate pa-
tentable subject matter test. What the appropriate test will be, what
business methods will be patent eligible, and what will be considered
an abstract idea will all have to be determined at a later date.
208 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
209 Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm'r for Patent Examination
Policy, to the Patent Examining Corps (June 28, 2010) (on file with author).
If a claimed method meets the machine-or-transformation test, the me-
thod is likely patent-eligible under [S]ection 101 unless there is a clear
indication that the method is directed to an abstract idea. If a claimed
method does not meet the machine-or-transformation test, the examiner
should reject the claim under [S]ection 101 unless there is a clear indica-
tion that the method is not directed to an abstract idea.
Id.
2o Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The Court, in sum, never provides
a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court
does not even explain if it is using the machine-or-transformation criteria.").
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